

Kennedy Ups and Downs

Advances and Setbacks of the Last Two Weeks Are Examined

By ARTHUR KROCK
WASHINGTON, Oct. 6.—Events of the last fortnight have written an ironical chapter in the history of the Presidency of John F. Kennedy. A statement which, at the end of his first year in office, he termed his greatest "disappointment" had just been resolved favorably for his standpoint, when a prospect he had termed the "most heartening" in his first Presidential year was violently reversed.

"The most disappointing event," he told a White House news conference on Jan. 15, 1962, "was our failure to get an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing." The "most heartening" was, he said, "the fact that I think there is a greater surge for unity... in our relations with Latin America... and it has become more obvious that they desire to be free and independent."


During the last fortnight the President had successfully negotiated the nuclear weapons test-ban treaty and received overwhelming approval of the Senate for its ratification. But "our relations with Latin America," he had become hostile in an expanding area. And, whatever the degree of desire of the people in these areas to be "free and independent," Communist disorders and the overthrow of civilian governments by military dictatorships had made this impossible.

In this same period, the intra-Government war over Vietnam policy among the civilian units in Saigon and in Washington came into the open with the president that the United States could no longer "indulge the hope it would settle itself." He was also "moving" about the 1964 political front to take the sour with the sweet.



The sweet was the roar of some of the crowds who greeted him on a tour undertaken in the joint interest of conserving national resources and the fact that there is a greater surge for unity in the Western nations. The sour was the roar of some of the crowds who greeted him on a tour undertaken in the joint interest of conserving national resources and the fact that there is a greater surge for unity in the Western nations.

More Ebb Than Flow
In the January, 1962, news conference Mr. Kennedy also cited as "most heartening" the fact that there is a greater surge for unity in the Western nations. He may still have found this "surge" in the drawing together this week of the United Kingdom and the United States in negotiations with the Soviet Union for further steps toward limitations on the employment of nuclear weapons power. But there is a "surge" in the mounting efforts of President de Gaulle to separate the Western European from United States policies, and in the display these efforts have brought in NATO. So a certain distress has suffused another prospect which Mr. Kennedy found "most heartening" a while ago. Asked more recently at a news conference for comments on the "ebb and flow" of situations he was encountering, which then as now were becoming more ebb than flow, the President responded that, nevertheless, he did not estimate that period to be the "winter of our discontent." Perhaps he would make the same estimate of the upward events in this "Indian Summer" of 1963. But, as on



Opinion of the Week: At Home and Abroad

VIETNAM REPORT

The President's appraisal of the war in South Vietnam, following return of the McNamara-Taylor mission, drew comment from the news last week, most of it critical. Some viewed it as optimistic; others noted continuing differences between the State Department and the Army over the situation. These are examples.

The White House statement including the McNamara-Taylor prediction that the United States military task can be completed by the end of 1965 is most unexpected. This kind of groundless prophecy may have the political merit of pleasing those who wish to keep troops home at the same time it reassures those who wish to keep them there. It has no other merit. The American people ought to feel dismayed by this affront to their maturity and intelligence. —WASHINGTON POST.


It is premature to conclude that the trip which took the nation's two highest defense officials to the other side of the globe was a success. The final act of the "Vietnam mission" was the President's approval of a general policy favoring the sale of a part of our wheat crop to the Russians. It is not a strategic commodity and although its sale to the Russians would undoubtedly help them over a tough spot, it would also benefit the United States. Whether gold from Federal stockpiles or from current production, the net effect of the sale would be to reduce our surplus and perhaps, our grain storage costs. —ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS.

On straight economic grounds, the United States clearly has something to gain from an expansion of trade with the Soviet Union, including a possible sale of surplus wheat which would help them over a tough spot, it would also benefit the United States. Whether gold from Federal stockpiles or from current production, the net effect of the sale would be to reduce our surplus and perhaps, our grain storage costs. —ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS.

The policy paper said the war might be won by the end of 1965. The statement, which has its origin in the internal Vietnam political situation, is far different than the one which the State Department issued last week. It is a show-down with a dirty, resourceful and far-from-idealistic enemy in Vietnam, and it is a show-down with a dirty, resourceful and far-from-idealistic enemy in Vietnam, and it is a show-down with a dirty, resourceful and far-from-idealistic enemy in Vietnam.

We sincerely hope the optimism is justified. But it is necessary to recall that France wore rose-colored glasses almost until the fall of Dien Bien-Phu and its loss of all Indochina. The United States has pledged not to block further Communist encroachment in Southeast Asia. But American should not be surprised if the effort is long and costly. —ATLANTA CONSTITUTION.

Somewhat back in history, I seem to remember the cry was raised not far from here: "NO



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Answers to Questions on Page 2
1. Bretton Woods, N. H. Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington, D. C., was where the United Nations Charter was drafted. San Francisco is where the Charter was signed.
2. Barbers. They are indigenous to North Africa, having inhabited that area long before it was invaded by the Arabs from the Middle East.
3. True. Section 2 of the 13th Amendment provides for reduction of the "basis of representation" in the Congress of any state denying "the right to vote" to any of its "male inhabitants." The 19th Amendment extends that protection to women voters also.
4. Senator Fulbright, Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Minority Leader.
5. Palestinian.
6. All four.
7. J. Edward Day.
8. Guatemala in April, Ecuador in July, and the Dominican Republic in September.
9. 136,234 miles per second.
10. A Russian play against anti-Semitism, by Yevgeny Yevtushenko.

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Optimism Grows at U.N.

East-West Accords Viewed as Bringing Improvement in World Climate

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON
The first three weeks of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly have strengthened the optimism produced by the signature of the limited nuclear test ban treaty and the virtual absence of belligerent language regarding the great issues in dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In their statements to the General Assembly, Mr. Kennedy and Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, not only pledged their Governments to peaceful competition, but laid the groundwork for an agreement on exclusion of nuclear weapons from space vehicles.

Only two months have elapsed since the three foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain signed the Treaty of Moscow, which prohibits nuclear tests in space, in the atmosphere, and under water. Obviously there has been a marked improvement in the international climate, but it remains to be seen how long it will last.

There was similar rejoicing in the General Assembly in 1955, when the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France agreed at long last on the Austrian State Treaty, which was followed by a festival of good cheer at the Big Four summit meeting in Geneva.

"The spirit of Geneva" became a theme song at the United Nations. But it did not survive the Soviet Union's ruthless suppression of the revolt in Hungary a year later.

Softened Times
There was also rejoicing at the 1959 session after Mr. Khrushchev visited President Eisenhower at Camp David and gave assurance that he would not press the West Berlin question to a showdown. By the time the 1960 session began, however, United Nations delegates had stopped invoking "the spirit of Camp David."

Mr. Khrushchev's behavior toward General Eisenhower over the U-2 incident, and the Soviet campaign to drive Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld out of office had once again produced a crisis atmosphere in the Assembly.

When the 1962 session began, optimism was already gathering over the Soviet Union's control over Cuba. But no one outside the Communist bloc suspected that the Soviet Union at that moment was installing missiles on Cuban territory and that one of the most serious crises of the post-war era was near.

This does not mean, of course, that such a show face in Soviet policy is an easy feat. Soviet policy is complicated by the fact that the most important reason for the shift in Soviet policy is the high cost of the nuclear arms race. This has now reached its most expensive phase: neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can afford the risk of leaving any point uncovered, yet the combined cost of the weapons and the electronic detector devices is staggering.

Pressures on Khrushchev
Even in these straits the Soviet Union has not agreed to admit outside inspectors to its territory, neither the nuclear treaty nor the impending prohibition of nuclear space weapons call for any form of inspection.

The evidence suggests that Mr. Khrushchev agreed to the prohibition of all except underground tests because this would "freeze" existing types of nuclear weapons, reducing the cost to the Soviet Union. Will he now agree to a reduction in armaments and armed forces at the price of inspection or political issues?

At the present stage no one can know the answer to these questions. It may be that rather than see the Communist world split into two hostile camps, Mr. Khrushchev will decide to make up with Peking, which would mean agreements with the West on disarmament or anything else.

Until the situation is clear, the United States can be expected to continue its wary exploration of the new opportunities that seem to have arisen in the last operational plans for a nuclear war.

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